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CRITICALLY EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST THE 1998 HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
Terrorist threats, Anti-Terrorism and the case against the Human Rights Act 
CONOR GEARTY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is surely no field of public discourse that has challenged human rights law more seriously than 
that of counter-terrorism. Each shares the same roots in liberal democracy but push such polities in 
radical different directions. Terrorism, ‘the weapon of the weak’ to use that ‘oft-repeated dictum’1 
uses violence against civilian actors as a means of communicating a message to power rather than as 
a way of scoring a military success over it. This sort of action thrives in open societies because it is in 
such places that can be found the freedom necessary to the successful execution of its violence: the 
insecure transport system; the open sporting and cultural venues; the (relative) absence of state 
surveillance; the tolerance of radical speech.2  With its indiscriminate reach, its invariable 
suddenness, its calculated brutality, and its disregard of traditional laws of war, terrorist violence 
causes terror not only to whose unlucky enough to be subject to it but to those who – witnessing 
what has happened - fear they might be next.  It is this randomness that drives a horror of such 
violence into the heart of liberal society.3  Somehow we think that we can by our own careful actions 
avoid the car accident, or the armed robber, or the burglar, but who can plan against an assault on a 
movie theatre, or the hotel at which we are staying or the concert to which we have gone?  Those 
whose positions of responsibility mean they are the intended recipients of the message so bloodily 
communicated - our political leaders; our police chiefs - take particular umbrage at being required by 
the perpetrators to try to glean the meaning intended by such deliberate carnage.  Why should they 
when the message has been so bloodily delivered? Surely the right response is to crack down hard 
on those responsible, not listen sympathetically to what they say? And while pursuing past 
wrongdoers those same leaders feel compelled to prevent further atrocities: there are other stable 
doors that can be locked even if this one, violent horse has bolted. 
Seeming to stand in the way of the robust action so often demanded by terrorist atrocity are the 
very principles of liberal democratic society that have made such assaults logistically possible, and 
indeed which some terrorist campaigns seek deliberately to destroy: the ‘pluralism, tolerance and 
broad-mindedness’ celebrated as an especial strength of all such societies,4 and the requirements of 
fairness, due process and individuated justice that are part and parcel of the liberal perspective on 
the world. At the core of these principles, the term that has come increasingly to encapsulate them, 
is the phrase ‘human rights’.  Human rights are invariably embedded not only in liberal democracy’s 
                                                          
1
 Paul D’Anieri,   International Politics. Power and Purpose in Global Affairs (3
rd
 edn, Wadsworth, 2013), 280. 
For two very perceptive studies see Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want. Understanding the Enemy; 
Containing the Threat (John Murray 2006) and Richard English, Does Terrorism Work (Oxford, 2016)..  
2
  Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: the Liberal State’s Response (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2011). On free 
speech aspects see Ian Cram, Terror and the War on Dissent. Freedom of Expression in the Age of Al-Qaeda 
(Springer 2009). 
3
  Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (OUP 2009), esp ch 1. 
4
  Echoing here of course the frequently expressed phraseology of the European Court of Human Rights, for an 
early and influential conceptualisation see Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407 at [41]. 
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political discourse but in its local, regional and international law as well.  The essence of such rights 
is captured in their insistence on taking the individual seriously – respect for human dignity is often 
taken as the basis of our rights culture.5  This demand does not buckle under utilitarian pressure.  
Nor does it blink when confronted by the ‘enemy within’ or ‘the enemy without’ – human rights are 
as blind to ethnic and national origin as they are to gender and (in most contemporary forms) sexual 
orientation.  These rights are the clearest manifestation in law of the global dream, that to be ‘a 
citizen of nowhere’6 is not an insult to be suffered but a badge to be proudly worn, that the world is 
composed of individual free people rather than various (nationally defined) peoples. 
Conceived and then enacted in the last years of the 1990s, the Human Rights Act entered a counter-
terrorism arena in which commitments to human rights had already proved controversial. The 
European Court of Human Rights had caused extreme controversy in 1978 when it had found that 
the British treatment of selected internees in Northern Ireland had breached the prohibition on 
inhuman and degrading treatment which is to be found in Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.7 A decade later the finding that a pre-charge detention period of up to seven days for 
terrorist suspects breached the right to a judge under Article 5(3) enraged the administration of Mrs 
Margaret Thatcher and provoked a limited derogation under Article 15 (afterwards upheld by the 
Strasbourg court).8  In the years running up to the Human Rights Act two further interventions 
caused particular uproar. In 1995, the Strasbourg Court ruled (albeit by the narrowest of margins, 
ten votes to nine) that the UK had breached the Article 2 rights of three acknowledged IRA members 
whom its Special Air Services had shot dead in Gibraltar, where the three had been planning a major 
bombing.9 Then the following year the Court insisted that foreigners suspected of terrorism could 
not be simply deported if the serious risk was that what awaited them where they were being sent 
was some serious violation of their rights, such as, in particular, their right not to be tortured or 
killed, or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.10  The Home Secretary 
whose job it was to deal with both these cases was Michael Howard and though there was 
acceptance in each case it was begrudging and as minimalist as possible.  Howard went on to be 
leader of the Conservative opposition to Tony Blair’s New Labour Government during that 
Administration’s second term, and a young political adviser of this time in Government went on to 
succeed Howard as Tory leader in 1995 – David Cameron. 
The terrorist-related arguments mustered against the Human Rights Act have never been phantoms 
dreamt up by opponents whose hostility has got the better of their reason. They have flowed out of 
a radically different view of what liberal democracy ought to be allowed to do in its own defence, a 
view that had, as some of the cases above remind us, already underscored decades of hostility to 
rights when Northern Ireland related political violence had been the problem and the European 
                                                          
5
  Chris McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013). 
6
 Theresa May, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference 2016 – full text at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/ [accessed 14 
November 2016].  
7
  Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25. 
8
 Brogan v United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117; Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom (1993) 17 EHRR 
539. 
9
  McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97. 
10
  Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
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Court (rather than any local tribunal) the human-rights-irritant.11  The commitment to universal 
human rights has not implausibly seemed to impede the ‘struggle’ (or in wilder renditions the ‘war’) 
against terrorism. Why should not the safety of the state be able to be taken into account when 
decisions about the removal of dangerous foreigners come to be made? Is not the (lengthy if needs 
be) detention of suspected terrorists not entirely appropriate in cases where there is evidence of the 
involvement of such people in terrorist acts even if this cannot be proved in court? Why should the 
obligations of due process be blind to the fact that the individual in the dock is committed not 
merely to his or her own freedom but to the destruction of all of ours as well? 12  These sorts of 
questions were being asked even during passage of the Human Rights Bill and in the immediate 
aftermath (pre-implementation of the Act in October 2000), and by Labour government ministers as 
well as opposition spokespersons.13 But the events of 11 September 2001 gave them a fresh 
strength, and sense of urgency: must our society surrender before terrorist violence, going down 
with one hand tied firmly behind its back by human rights ideologues whose perfectionism is 
threatening to lead to our obliteration?  Even without the Al Qaida attacks of that day counter-
terrorism could well have been an important component in the critique of human rights that had 
already begun and was certain to grow.  But the actions of Osama Bin Laden and his cohort of 
suicide-killers have ensured that in the years that have followed it has been the demands of counter-
terrorism that have led the attack.14 The front-line has been fought out over detention and 
deportation, and it is to each of these turn first before moving to discuss the role of the criminal law 
in managing the tensions that are revealed in these two arenas of dispute. 
DETENTION AND CONTROL  
The 1996 decision of Chahal v United Kingdom, referred to in passing above,15 had concerned a Sikh 
terrorist whose return to India had been successfully resisted.  There was no suggestion of his being 
inclined or likely to engage in political violence within the United Kingdom, nor any complaint about 
this country’s entitlement to expel him.  The problem was a practical one that no jurisdiction would 
take him (or be obliged to take him) other than one to which it could be plausibly shown that he was 
at risk of having his Article 3 rights violated. In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 
attacks the Secretary of State for the Home Department David Blunkett found himself unable to 
expel a number of non-British residents against whom there were (to put it at its lowest) concerns 
about possible involvement with Al Qaida and/or organisations associated with it.  At the same time, 
it was thought impossible to proceed against them under the traditional criminal law: true that law’s 
substance had been greatly expanded so far as terrorism was concerned by the permanent and 
comprehensive Terrorism Act that had been passed in 2000 (on which more shortly), but even 
inchoate offences required admissible evidence by way of proof and none could in these cases be 
guaranteed.  
                                                          
11
  Aileen McColgan, ‘Lessons from the Past: Northern Ireland Terrorism Now and Then, and the Human Rights 
Act’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal protection of Human Rights: Sceptical 
Essays (OUP 2011).    
12
  On an attempt to reconcile human rights and terrorism-prevention see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil. 
Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh University Press 2004).  
13
 See the thoughts of the Home Secretary responsible for the Act, Jack Straw, Aspects of Law Reform. An 
Insider’s Perspective (CUP 2013), ch 2. 
14
  For an early overview of the post 2011 tensions see Conor Gearty, ‘11 September 2001, counter-terrorism 
and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32 (1) Journal of Law and Society 18-33. 
15
 Text at n 10 above. 
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Mr Blunkett’s decision was to introduce a system of administrative detention for those persons not 
of British origins who were suspected of being terrorists and whose expulsion was impossible for 
Chahal-based reasons. When the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security 2001 Act received the Royal 
Assent, seventeen men were certified under section 21 of Part IV of the Act as persons reasonably 
believed by the Home Secretary to be terrorists whose presence in the United Kingdom constituted 
a ‘risk to national security’ as a result of which – given they could not be removed – their (indefinite) 
detention was thereafter to be legally sanctioned. After early unsuccessful challenges, nine of the 
detainees found themselves before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, then the United 
Kingdom’s most senior judicial body. To the surprise of many, and the indignation of ministers, they 
scored an unequivocal victory.16 Because the detention was so obviously in breach of the European 
Convention’s right to liberty under Article 5, with there being next to no prospect of this being 
merely a preliminary move in deportation proceedings (allowed under Article 5(1)(f)), the 
Government had felt obliged to derogate from the effect of Article 5, as they were allowed to do 
under Article 15 so long as the country faced ‘a public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.  
The Lords were on the whole willing to give the authorities the benefit of the doubt on this, not 
without a few wobbles it is true, but where the majority were clear was that the selective detention 
without trial of foreign suspects was not ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ as is also 
demanded by Article 15. 
Here we see a first practical example of how the human rights idea rears up against those rooted in 
national security, the global versus the local.  It was precisely that aspect of the detention scheme 
that had made it politically feasible – the limiting of those subject to it to foreigners – that made it 
suspect under a human rights law that is ever (and from its perspective rightly) on the lookout for 
discrimination on grounds of nationality.17  And yet when asked to defend this discriminatory 
distinction, lawyers for the Home Secretary could not answer honestly along these lines because to 
do so would be to lose the case: the hierarchy of the laws under scrutiny placed human rights at the 
top. They therefore had no answer to the sort of unsettling analogies that were on the majority’s 
minds, perhaps best expressed by Lady Hale: 
No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But substitute ‘black’, ‘disabled’, ‘female’, ‘gay’, 
or any other similar adjective for ‘foreign’ before ‘suspected international terrorist’ and ask whether 
it would be justifiable to take power to lock up the group but not the ‘white’, ‘able-bodied’, ‘male’ or 
‘straight’ suspected international terrorists.  The answer is clear. 18 
The political reaction to the case was predictable, albeit diluted to some extent by the shock 
resignation - the day before it was delivered - of Mr Blunkett, brought down by an unrelated, 
personal matter.19 To his successor Charles Clarke fell the task of deciding how to respond to the 
judges. This was important because the form of the relief had been that of a declaration of 
incompatibility which meant of course that it could have simply been ignored by the authorities, 
                                                          
16
  A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68.  For a detailed review of 
the case see Conor Gearty ‘Human rights in an age of counter-terrorism: injurious, irrelevant or 
indispensable?’ (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 58, 25-46.   
17
  See in particular the prohibition on discrimination in Article 14. 
18
  Above n 16 at para 238. 
19
  ‘Blunkett Resigns’ Guardian 15 December 2004: 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/dec/15/davidblunkett.immigrationpolicy1 [accessed 15 November 
2016]. 
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pleading an overriding necessity to defend the state. To have done this would have been a 
somewhat  awkward manoeuvre from the Party that had after all only a short while before 
introduced the Human Rights Act, and would have necessitated as well an unattractive disregard of 
the rational arguments on the issue in favour of suspiciously broad appeals to security (necessary 
because justifying discrimination against non-nationals simply on that basis was still a political taboo 
in the mid 2000s). Nor would such robust disregard of human rights have solved anything in the 
medium term, being nearly certain shortly afterwards to have attracted the censorious oversight of 
the Strasbourg court.20  
Accordingly, in the Spring of 2005 the Government introduced a new system of control, eventually 
encapsulated in the Prevention of Terrorism Act of that year but only after a huge parliamentary 
struggle, particularly in the Upper House where matters were delayed by resistance from many 
peers to central features of the new legislative plans.21  For the purposes of this chapter it is not 
necessary to go into great detail about the complex system of ‘control orders’ that replaced the 
disgraced detention provisions other than to note how central human rights were both to the 
framing of the original bill and to the debate on detail that followed in Parliament. Key features of 
the new framework made this clear.  The administrative constraints under which subjects of control 
orders could be placed fell short of detention but could be extremely restrictive nonetheless.22 
Critically however these orders could be applied to British as well as non-British suspects alike.  
Additional safeguards were required to kick in where the planned restrictions on particular 
individuals were so severe as to warrant derogation under Article 15 (as opposed to when they did 
not, in which case oversight was milder).23   
The new law anticipated – indeed even required - judicial oversight for human rights compatibility, 
with the executive, seeking by these means to draw the courts into a near co-planning role with 
regard to what would and would not ‘work’ under the Convention. This produces our second 
practical example of the tension that has been produced by the application of human rights law 
between the political community on the one hand searching for decisive action and the courts on 
the other, insistent on seeing the individuals before them. The matter arose in the following way.  
True to the manner in which the Act had been constructed, a series of disputes arose early on the 
legitimacy of various control orders, with a central initial issue being the extent to which the right to 
due process was being eroded by the way in which these orders were being made. The leading case 
is Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, AE and AN.24 The law lords had already dealt 
with AF in earlier proceedings, Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB and AF.25 The issue 
common to all these applications was the degree to which non-derogating control orders needed to 
have more fairness added to them to be compatible with Article 6. In the first AF case Lord Bingham 
had spoken of the ‘core irreducible minimum of procedural protection’26 that was in his view absent 
                                                          
20
  See the Strasbourg ruling on those issues that remained open after the Belmarsh decision: A v United 
Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
21
  See Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, ‘Parliament and the House of Lords: A More Representative and Assertive 
Chamber?’ in Michael Rush and Philip Giddings (eds), The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2005 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2006) 122-136, esp at pp 128-129. 
22
  See ss 1 – 3. 
23
  See s 4. 
24
  [2009 ] UKSC 28, [2010] 2 AC 269. 
25
  [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440.    
26
  Ibid [43]. 
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in both cases then before him.  But others of the five on the Bench for that first set of proceedings 
had taken different views about what was required, Lord Hoffman holding that the chosen statutory 
framework of closed hearings and special advocates was probably consistent the Convention while 
Lady Hale, Lord Carswell and Lord Brown had been more inclined to root their decisions in the 
specific facts of the cases before them. The upshot of it all was by no means self-evident: where the 
government had wanted a general rule their lordships seemed to be offering endless judicial red 
tape.  Hence the second AF case, with AE and AN on this occasion, just two years later and now with 
nine judges instead of the usual five, and a recent decision in Strasbourg to contend with27 which 
had (as it happens) proved Lord Hoffmann’s earlier optimism on behalf the scheme unfounded. 
Their lordships and Lady Hale sought now in a series of carefully crafted speeches to be clear about 
what the Convention required, and how this could be achieved by reading down the 2005 Act rather 
than embarking on a new round of declarations of incompatibility. But it looked obstructive to those 
with security uppermost in their minds and speedy decisions to make in what they saw as a vital 
national interest. 
These two Lords decisions were, however, merely the tip of the iceberg so far as litigation was 
concerned. At the time of the hearing of AF, AE and AN there were 38 persons subject to control 
orders and apart from the seven who had absconded it did seem as though all the remaining 31 had 
been shrouded in a fog of litigation: AF’s second visit to the Lords represented no less that the eighth 
substantive hearing of his challenge.28 Procedure was not the only basis of attack: the rights to 
privacy and to liberty, and even on occasion to be protected from inhuman and degrading treatment 
were thrown into the mix by lawyers keen (not unreasonably) to do the very best for their clients. 
One would not have to have been a right-wing Home Secretary to be frustrated by such legal 
suffocation, and one would need to have been a saintly holder of that office to have seen that none 
of these entanglements with human rights were the fault of the judges as opposed to the 
parliamentary legislation that they were being required to interpret.  So why not get the judges to be 
clearer about what they expect, thereby helping law-makers by offering informal advice on what 
might pass human rights muster?  A reasonable question it might be thought, but one to which the 
judges took grave exception. Here was a third great tension between the executive and judicial 
branches, flowing out of the way in which separation of powers is arranged between the three 
branches of government, as irritating to ministers as it was constitutionally inevitable.   
In an early control order case to reach the House of Lords, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ,29 the issue had revolved around how severe the imposition of a home curfew 
needed to be to breach the Convention, in particular Article 5 but with Article 8 playing a role as 
well.  The Respondent Secretary of State looked for specifics (16 hours out of 24? 14 hours?), and in 
doing so was encouraged by judicial suggestions of a possible precise rule along these lines, from 
Lord Brown.30 This necessitated yet another trip back to an enlarged appellate tribunal, this time the 
                                                          
27
  A v United Kingdom (n 20). 
28
  See the details set out in the case itself [2009] UKSC 28, at [6] – [7] (Lord Phillips). 
29
  Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385. 
30
  ‘…[R]ather than leave the Secretary of State guessing as to the precise point at which control orders will be 
held vulnerable to article 5 challenges, …  for my part I would regard the acceptable limit to be 16 hours, 
leaving the suspect with 8 hours (admittedly in various respects controlled) liberty a day. Such a regime, in my 
opinion, can and should properly be characterised as one which restricts the suspect's liberty of movement 
rather than actually deprives him of his liberty’: ibid [105]. 
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newly established Supreme Court sitting as a bench of seven. In Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AP31 the Justices unanimously reiterated that all the circumstances needed to be 
taken into account, that no bright rule was possible, and – showing an enthusiasm to escape the 
miasma of litigation into which at this point even the Court itself felt it was at risk of submerging - 
that henceforth appeal courts would embrace ‘the wisdom of generally not interfering with [first 
instance] decisions in control order cases.’32  While these various cases were being brought, the 
senior judges’ reluctance to engage in behind the scenes discussions had begun to exasperate the 
Home Secretary of the day, Mr Charles Clarke, further widening the divide between the executive 
and the judiciary on matters related to counter-terrorism.33 Of course the judges could not risk pre-
empting hearings on specific cases by having been involved openly or (worse) behind closed doors in 
deliberations about abstract rules which would then apply to individuals before them. But the 
indignation of ministers engaged in good faith efforts to resolve the (as they saw it) havoc wreaked 
by human rights adjudication was also entirely understandable. The issue became moot with the 
disappearance of the control order scheme (and its replacement by a milder framework of Terrorist 
Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs)34), a casualty of the hostility of the Liberal 
Democratic part of the new coalition that emerged after the 2010 election. This change of 
administration also brought to power a Conservative Party by now dedicated to waging war on the 
Human Rights Act,35 and it was not long before a particular terrorism-related  casus belli presented 
itself. 
DEPORTATION 
The problem exposed by Chahal to which the scheme of administrative detention developed in 2001 
by Mr Blunkett had been a part answer did not disappear with the collapse of that legal edifice in the 
A deision in 2004 that we have just discussed.36  Nor did the control orders or TPIMs solve the 
problem of dangerous foreigners whose lack of criminal activity in the United Kingdom meant little 
when compared with their capacity for mischief abroad.  Here is our fourth practical tension: why 
should their personal inviolability be put before the safety of the state? And in particular, one such 
individual, the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Qatada (or to give him his original name Omar Othman). 
Long a thorn in the side of successive governments on account of his high public profile as a radical 
preacher in north London, Abu Qatada was able successfully to resist efforts to remove him for 
nearly a decade, relying on a combination of UK and Strasbourg human rights law to avoid his 
apparently inevitable fate.  Especially irksome to ministers was the way in which the safeguards in 
the Convention scheme appeared constantly to be expanding via new litigation to embrace fresh 
fears concerning his proposed forced return to Jordan, focusing not only on the risk of his being ill-
treated but also on the possible flagrant denial of justice at a trial of him which relied on evidence 
obtained by torture.  Eventually after much toing and froing between Whitehall, the Royal Courts of 
                                                          
31
  [2010] UKSC 24, [2011] 2 AC 1 at [3] (Lord Brown) (with whom Lords Phillips, Saville, Walker and Clarke 
agreed). 
32
  Ibid [20] (Lord Brown). 
33
  House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 6
th
 report Session 2006-7 (11 July 2007) paras 93-97 
has the details of the controversy surrounding the issue: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldconst/151/15104.htm [accessed 15 November 
2016] 
34
 Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011. 
35
  Conservative Manifesto 2010, Invitation to join the Government of Britain p 79. 
36
  Text at n 16 above. 
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Justice and Strasbourg, and even a visit to Jordan by the then Home Secretary herself Mrs Theresa 
May, Abu Qatada was finally flown out of the United Kingdom in July 2013.37  
The long-running litigation was as damaging to the public perception of the Human Rights Act as the 
John Hirst prisoners’ voting decision has been to Strasbourg.38 In both cases the applicant appeared 
to have been drawn from a ‘central casting’ parade of villains, with each being as friendly to the 
media as they were alienating to the audiences who therefore had the chance to see them.  The 
judgments have each been more a saga than a simple case, ensuring there was no protection in the 
temporary nature of their impact. So with Hirst we have had numerous copy-cat actions by other 
prisoners and frequent efforts by the Council of Europe (through its Committee of Ministers) to 
secure UK compliance,39 while Abu Qatada has given us a seemingly endless round of applications 
for this and that relief as the case slowly inched its way to its 2013 denouement. Even as early as the 
premiership of Tony Blair, Home Secretary John Reid had been calling for modifications of the Act to 
allow deportations of foreigners judged undesirable,40  while in 2006 Blair himself had thrown out 
the suggestion of a possible veto on court judgments after a  decision to block the return to their 
country of nine Afghan hijackers was described by him as an ‘abuse of common sense’.41 So much 
had the Abu Qatada case commanded public attention that the success enjoyed by Mrs May in 
finally having him removed under her watch was frequently mentioned by supporters in the course 
of her short but successful campaign to succeed David Cameron as Prime Minister.42 Rarely if ever 
are the successes enjoyed by the authorities in deporting terrorist suspects put in the balance in the 
discussion on human rights that inevitably ensues this or that successful resistance to a removal, the 
successful extradition of Babar Ahmad for example.43 Still less is any serious regard taken of why 
these individuals cannot be simply dumped abroad, why a country that says it takes human rights 
seriously should be so relaxed (as much of the media and indeed ministers seem to be) about 
torture, flagrant denials of justice and other egregious human rights breaches as long as they happen 
elsewhere (and even if it has been our actions that have facilitated the abuse). 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Opponents of human rights who got stuck in during the Abu Qatada saga rarely note that without 
the torture evidence that was to have been used the man was in due course acquitted by Jordan’s 
State Security Court of charges of conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts.44  In the field of terrorism 
and human rights, the availability of the criminal law is the great dog that does not bark, the 
unmentioned option that critics may not even be aware of when they launch their attacks or which 
                                                          
37
  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23213740   [accessed 14 November 2016]. 
38
  Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005) 42 EHRR 849. 
39
 For a summary of these activities and a full update of recent developments see House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper, Prisoners’ Voting Rights: Developments since May 2015 (CPB 7461, 12 January 2016). 
40
 ‘John Reid calls for human rights law reform’ Telegraph 17 September 2007: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563347/John-Reid-calls-for-human-rights-law-reform.html 
[accessed 16 November 2016]. 
41
 ‘Blair to amend human rights law’ BBC News 14 May 2006: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4770231.stm 
[accessed 15 November 2016]. 
42
  See for example this article by Mrs May’s supporter and Employment Minister Priti Patel in the Sun on 8 July 
2016: https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1410048/theresa-may-has-the-vision-determination-and-experience-
to-be-our-next-prime-minister-and-is-the-strongest-candidate-for-the-job/ [accessed 15 November 2016]. 
43
  Ahmad v United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 1. 
44
  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-29340656 [accessed 15 November 2016]. 
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they choose to ignore if they are. Human rights law insists on a proper criminal law system and on 
adequate enforcement of it – the state’s positive obligation to protect rights (including the right to 
life in Article 2) makes inevitable such a demand.  The word ‘proper’ does a great deal of work here – 
the European Convention (and therefore the Human Rights Act) insists that the trial of terrorist 
suspects for this or that specific crime should be fairly conducted – Article 6  goes into great detail 
about what this entails as a matter of practice.  As to the content of that criminal law, the Strasbourg 
system is relaxed to the point of near-civil-libertarian carelessness – countries can create whatever 
substantive criminal law they desire so long as the basics of a fair trial are observed.45 Thus there 
was no serious objection to the charge against Abu Qatada having been one of ‘conspiracy’ (rather 
than any specific action).  
The medley of provisions that had been available in 2001 as an alternative to the subsequently 
disgraced detention power taken in the 2001 Act included (all with a very wide definition of 
terrorism46) those to be found in no fewer than 23 of the 64 sections scattered across the first six 
parts of the comprehensive Terrorism Act 2000, in force from 19 February 2001. These included: 
instruction or training in firearms or explosives (at home or abroad), or inviting someone to take part 
in such training; 47  collecting information ‘of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism’, or merely possessing this kind of information;48 directing ‘at any level, 
the activities of an organisation which is concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism’ (with a 
punishment of up to life in prison);49 and even the double thought crime of possessing ‘an article in 
circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that [the] possession is for a purpose 
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism’.50 The 2000 Act 
contained an offence of inciting terrorism overseas which allowed the authorities to proceed against 
residents and punish them as though that which they had incited (murder; offences against the 
person; criminal damage) had actually occurred, despite the incitement being specifically to commit 
acts of such terrorism abroad, with it being ‘immaterial whether or not the person incited is in the 
United Kingdom at the time of the incitement.’51 Later anti-terrorism legislation has added more 
powers to support these criminal laws – and the ordinary criminal law as well of course it should be 
remembered - on a regular basis, as we have seen in 200152 200653 and 2008.54 
Why is this criminal model of law enforcement not enough for the proponents of a tough line on 
terrorism?  If it were, there would be no conflict with the Convention except insofar as its 
enforcement via the exercise of police discretion (on stop and search for example55) might attract 
the critical attention of a Court vigilant to prevent undue invasions of privacy and/or discriminatory 
action against vulnerable groups. This would be – and has been -  irritating to the authorities but 
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  See Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions [2015] UKSC 49, [2015] AC 49 where the challenge is as usual to 
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would hardly constitute in itself a basis for the sort of hostility which as we have seen defenders of 
anti-terrorism law have meted out to human rights.  There is a deeper explanation, a fifth and final 
practical example of the way in which the 1998 Act challenges assumptions about national security 
that are deeply embedded within the state.   
For much of the 20th century the United Kingdom had to deal with an enemy that challenged the 
integrity of the state’s political institutions, both from without and (more relevantly for our 
purposes) from within. The Soviet Union and its satellite states had sympathetic Communist party 
members operating lawfully within Britain whose danger was judged to be such that their activities 
did not have to fall within the criminal sphere before close scrutiny of them could be justified. Over 
time a grand system of state security grew up, staffed by intelligence services, whose job it was to be 
vigilant against this external and internal threat and to act decisively when needed in the interests of 
national security.56  None of this operated in accordance with any transparent law.57  Criminal 
prosecution was the exception rather than the rule.58  Executive discretion and secrecy ruled.  
Intelligence was gathered to assist in executive decision-making, not the prosecution of crimes. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s this large-scale institutional framework lost the 
enemy whose existence had been its rationale.  At the same time and under pressure from litigation 
in the European Court of Human Rights, which had found that to the extent that these security 
activities invaded rights then their lack of a legal basis took them outside the Convention,59 
legislation placed the UK’s various security services on a statutory basis, MI5 in 1989,60 and MI6 and 
GCHQ  in 1994.61  In Spring 1992, after a series of mishaps in the policing of terrorism in the UK, 
primacy in the field of counter-terrorism (then mainly against the Irish Republican Army of course) 
was handed from the police over to the security services.62 Since then we have seen a strong 
momentum towards reconfiguring counter-terrorism along a ‘Cold War’ rather than a policing 
model.  With their emphasis on executive discretion based on secret intelligence, the detention and 
control order powers earlier discussed fit this bill very well, as do the wider powers in legislation 
which allow detention before charge of such long duration that it can easily begin to look like short-
term internment.63   
Coming along in 1998 and fully in 2000, the Human Rights Act has posed a direct challenge to this 
growing edifice of administrative control. We have already seen how human-rights-based hostility 
has forced changes to the anti-terrorism powers taken in reaction to the 11 September 2001 attacks.  
A further example of the same point that came before 11 September is the power of proscription.  In 
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pre-legislative plans for what became the Terrorism Act 2000 and following earlier statutory 
precedents64 the power to ban ‘terrorist’ organisations had been reposed entirely in the Home 
Secretary, subject only to what was confidently expected would be the lightest of light touch judicial 
review.  But before the Act took its final shape, decisions in the European Court of Human Rights had 
made clear that more safeguards would be needed if the power were to survive the guarantee of 
freedom of association that is to be found in Article 11 of the European Convention and which would 
soon be part of domestic law.65  A new tribunal was duly created, to which those facing such bans 
could take their cases, the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC)   and it has proved 
surprisingly effective.66  
Here we see a pattern.  The security and human rights models have played out a score draw, with 
neither winning triumphantly but each avoiding defeat.  Crimes continue to be prosecuted and 
security services maintain their secret activities and their intelligence gathering.  Where the activities 
of the latter require action that impacts on rights, it is not directly prevented by human rights law. 
Rather it is channelled into quasi-judicial realms, places that mimic traditional judicial proceedings 
without being quite the full deal. Here is the battleground that has thrown the tension between 
human rights and security into sharp relief: how much should the former yield to the latter, how 
much ‘judicial’ should there be and how much be left at the merely ‘quasi’?  In the sequel to the 
Belmarsh case in the European Court of Human Rights, A v United Kingdom,67 the Strasbourg judges 
demanded that those affected by secret proceedings should at least be informed of the gist of the 
case against them, a ruling that was reluctantly accepted by the Supreme Court.68  The easiest way 
to cut through to a human-rights-sensitive solution in these and other cases would be to allow into 
criminal proceedings evidence against suspects that had been secured via lawfully obtained material 
from state interception of their communications. Currently prohibited by domestic law, it has been 
the authorities who have stoutly resisted all change in this area: such stuff belongs to the world of 
intelligence rather than policing.69   And where court cases threaten to reveal too much, then better 
they go into fully secret session or be allowed to collapse than that the State be forced by the 
eccentric simplicities of the criminal process to reveal its hand.70 
CONCLUSION 
No one case encapsulates the pressure placed on human rights law by the demands of anti-terrorism 
than that of Moazzam Begg. Held in Guantanamo and before that Bagram jail in Afghanistan for 
three years and then subjected to close police scrutiny on his return to the United Kingdom, he was 
charged with serious terrorist offences in 2014, leading to his being remanded without custody in 
Belmarsh prison for seven months.  On the day that the criminal proceedings against him were 
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scheduled to start however the Crown withdrew the charges and suddenly he was free to go.71 Begg 
has never been convicted of any crime and yet his life has been severely affected by the application 
to him of various administrative powers that have been derived from judgments made on the basis 
of national security that were never intended to be exposed to public view. The human rights 
insistence on equality and on individual dignity insists that they should be.  The utilitarian demands 
of security condemns such scrupulousness as reckless and misguided. Stuck with a statutory 
insistence to respect the former, in the face of strong calls for the latter from both political leaders 
of all parties and the popular media, the courts do their best to deliver on a legislative mandate in 
which the legislature appears no longer to believe. If it is fatally diluted by a new Bill of Rights (long 
in the wings but not yet centre stage72) those who believe in equality of respect and individual 
freedom may look back on the period of the Human Rights Act with nostalgic sadness. If the Act is 
destroyed, one of the forces that will have greatly weakened it for that kill will have been the 
counter-terrorist critique. 
  
                                                          
71
  Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘The strange case of Moazzam Begg’ Guardian 7 Octgober 2014: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2014/oct/07/moazzam-begg-mi5-syria 
[accessed 19 November 2016]. 
72
 Protecting Human Rights in the UK. The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws 
[undated but October 1014]:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/03_10_14_humanrights.pdf  
[accessed 19 November 2016]. 
